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Government Housing Assistance To The Poor
Low-income families are usually understood to have a special claim
to government housing assistance. When Congress offers a housing
benefit to the rest of the population, the subsidy is disguised as a low-
interest loan, mortgage insurance, or the sale of land at less than fair
market value. Only units that serve the poor receive direct, cash contri-
butions. This attitude is reflected in federal housing legislation which,
as often as not, contains some sort of income limitation.
But the result of thirty years of federal intervention in the housing
market has not been a bonanza for the poor. Critics regularly expose
programs which, either in design or administration, exclude low-
income families from their benefits. Programs that do reach poor
people-in particular, traditional public housing-are considered un-
imaginative and badly administered. The disillusionment with public
housing has increased interest in other forms of housing assistance
which offer an escape from the inhuniane environment of the public
project. This paper considers three approaches which have become a
part of the federal housing program (§ 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest
Rate (BMIR) mortgages, the Widnall "leased units" plan, and rent
supplements) in addition to traditional public housing. The final
section of the paper considers alternative criteria for low-income hous-
ing assistance and applies these standards to the four programs.
I. Four Low-Income Housing Programs
A. The Public Housing Program
The United States Housing Act of 1937,1 which developed the basic
public housing formula, retreated from the more radical New Deal
policy of federal sponsorship of subsidized housing developments.2 It
1. 50 Stat. 888 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1964). For a description
of the public housing program, see R. FISHER, TWENTY YEARs OF PuBuc HoUSINo (1959)
and the Annual Reports of the Housing and Home Finance Administration and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
2. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 § 1, 49 Stat. 115. See McFarland, The
Administration of the New Deal Greenbelt Towns, 32 J. Am. INst. OF PLANNERS 217
(1966). See ,lso, National Industrial Recovery Act § 202(d), 48 Stat. 201 (1933).
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placed responsibility for project design and administration in inde-
pendent local authorities, which have retained control ever since. This
decision was prompted by local resentment against the federal Public
Works Administration, and by a Sixth Circuit decision that slum
clearance and construction of low-rent housing were not a legitimate
public purpose for the federal exercise of eminent domain.a The inde-
pendent authority form, typified by an unpaid board or commissioners
appointed by the mayor, was chosen to insulate the program from
"politics" and municipal corruption and to avoid municipal debt
limitations.4 The federal Public Housing Administration (PHA) acts
only at the summons of local officials. States can veto public housing
projects by failing to enact enabling legislation, 5 and municipalities
and counties commonly refuse to establish housing authorities. In
particular, suburban governments are reluctant to subsidize shelter
for low-income migrants from core cities. Even a municipality with an
authority need not have an active public housing program. The city
council can veto a project that its housing authority proposes by refus-
ing to sign the cooperation agreement which PHA requires or by re-
fusing to assent to the loan request.7 In practice, the local governing
body is unlikely to consent to any projects outside of slum areas.8 Many
jurisdictions require public housing projects to be approved by voters
in referenda.9 Public housing was rejected in over 60 per cent of the ref-
3. United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky.
1935), aff'd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1955), dismissed on motion of the Solicitor General, 294
U.S. 735 (1935).
4. MEYERSON & BANFIL, PoLITcs, PLANNING, AND THE PUmLTC IN7ERMS 38S9 (1955).
5. At the end of 1964, the only state without PHA-aided low rent projects operated
by local authorities was Oklahoma. 18 HousiGa & Holm FINANCE ADnMN. = .REP. 235
(1964).
6. As of March 3, 1963, the incidence of housing authorities in cities of various sizes
was as follows:
Population of City NCwith Local
in 1960 Number of Cities Housing Authorities




Derived from PHA REP. No. 102.1 (Statistics Branch, July 1, 1963).
7. Housing Act of 1949 § 501(7)(a)(i), 63 Stat. 422, 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a)(i) (1964).
8. For the history of a controversial attempt to locate public housing projects in
nonslum areas of Chicago, see MEYEPMON & BANFIELD, op. Cit. supra note 4.
9. See, e.g., C.LI. CONsr. art. XXXIV, § 1. Restrictions in several appropriations bills
have explicitly required PHA to honor a local decision not to construct public housing,
e.g., 65 Stat. 277 (1951), and 67 Stat. 306 (1953).
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erenda held during the early nineteen-fifties; often, however, the
ballot question was slanted against the proposed projects. 10
A public housing project receives at least four subsidies. Its develop-
ment cost is permanently financed with long-term serial bonds of the
local authority. Interest from these bonds is exempt from the federal
income tax1 and from most state income taxes. These exemptions
lower the interest rates on the bonds by at least 1 per cent, and possibly
2 per cent.12 The PHA assures the security of these bonds by contract-
ing with the local authority to pay annual contributions equal to their
debt service charges. Since the authorities apply their net resources
toward debt service, the federal government usually bears only a frac-
tion of debt service costs while in effect insuring the remainder."8
The PHA is also authorized to pay a local authority an additional
$120 per year for the benefit of each elderly family and certain dis-
placed families.14 The project itself is exempted from all real or per-
sonal property taxes imposed by the state or its subdivisions, but the
project does make a payment in-lieu-of taxes to the local governing
body.15 The in-lieu payment is normally computed at 10 per cent of the
annual shelter rents received by a project. Finally, the federal govern-
ment absorbs the administrative costs of the PHA-approximately
$16 million in 1964.16
These subsidies make public housing so cheap that if it were widely
available, it might deter private housing construction and damage
private owners. As a protective buffer Congress established a "gap"
of 20 per cent between (1) the income which enables a family to afford
adequate private housing with one-fifth of its income, and (2) the income
limit for eligibility in public housing.'7 This gap has since been elim-
inated for the elderly, those displaced by government action, 8 and for
10. MEYaSON & BANFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 24.
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a)(1).
12. Since municipal bonds are ideal for investors in high tax brackets, Rep. Henry
Reuss (Dem., Wis.) has even charged that the public housing program primarily helps
the rich. Hearings on H.R. 5840 and Related Bills Before the Subcommittee on Housing
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 [hereinafter
cited as 1965 House Hearings].
13. For example, Table IV-11, 18 HHFA ANN. REP. 265 (1964) reveals that in fiscal
1964 federal contributions were only 56% of the maximum, possible under its annual
contributions contracts.
14. Housing Act of 1961 § 203, 75 Stat. 163 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1964).
15. Housing Act of 1949 § 305(h) (first proviso), 63 Stat. 428, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1964).
16. Table IV-15, 18 HHFA ANN. REP'. (1964).
17. Housing Act of 1949 § 301(7)(b)(ii), 63 Stat. 422, 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(b)(ii) (1964).
18. United States Housing Act of 1937 § 15(7)(b)(ii), as amended by Housing Act of
1961 § 206(a)4, 75 Stat. 165, 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(b)(ii) (1964).
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the handicapped.19 Since 1961, local authorities have had considerable
discretion in fixing income limits and rents.20 Their decisions on these
matters, however, must still be ratified by PHA. Local authorities over-
whelmed by applications for their projects commonly set income limits
at levels below those required to maintain the "gap." Income limits
also vary with size of family and geographical area. At the end of
1964 the median income limit for admission of a family of two adults
and two children, in localities within urbanized areas, was $4,000. The
highest limit ($5,760) was in New York City.2 '
Limits for continued occupancy are normally set at 125 per cent of
the limits for admission; tenants who earn more than that amount are
ultimately evicted.22 Although local practice in setting rents varies
considerably, most authorities use a graded scale which requires the
tenant to pay around 20 per cent of his net income for rent. Net income
is gross income less exemptions, e.g., a fixed amount for each child, the
first several hundred dollars of a child's earnings, etc. Minimum and
maximum rents are established in some localities.2 Besides approving
income limits and rents, PHA supplies local authorities with technical
assistance, budgets the available funds, and conducts periodic reviews
and surveys. The local authorities, however, make the basic develop-
ment decisions, such as site selection and project design, and manage
the projects. Graft has not been a serious problem.
By February 28, 1966, the federal public housing program included
608,601 units, which housed slightly over two million persons.2
These impressive figures conceal the fact that public housing has
ceased to perform its most important social function. Of the 26,000
new units constructed annually,2 5 about half are designed exclusively
for the elderly,26 and many of the rest are located in small towns just
beginning participation in the program. The program no longer pro-
vides much new housing for the non-elderly low-income families living
19. Housing Act of 1964 § 203(d), § 401(a), 78 Stat. 784, 794, amending Housing Act
of 1937 § 2(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1964). The 1964 act included handicapped persons
under the definition of "elderly," and thus excepted them from the "gap" requirement.
20. Housing Act of 1961 § 205(a), 75 Stat. 164, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (194.
21. Annual Report of Maximum Income Limits and Rents in Low-Rent Housing,
PHA REP. No. 222.0 (Statistics Branch, Dec. 31, 1964).
22. Housing Act of 1961 § 205 10(g)(3), 75 Stat. 164,42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1964).
23. PHA RP. No. 222.0, op. cit. supra note 21.
24. Program Status, PHA REP. (Statistics Branch, March 15, 1966). On September 30,
1965, 29% of all public housing units were occupied by elderly persons or families, 50%
by non-whites, and 26% by one adult with minors.
25. Derived from Table 2, Part 1, PHA RaP. No. 600.10 (Statistics Branch, Feb. 23,
1966).
26. On February 28, 1966, 22,157 of the 43,565 public housing units under construction
were designed exclusively for the elderly. PHA RPt. No. 600.10, op. cit. supra note 24.
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in urban ghettos. One important reason is that the concentration of
"problem type persons" in the projects has diverted public housing
officials from building new units to supplying their tenants with social
services.27 As problems with tenants have multiplied, public housing
officials have become increasingly authoritarian in their approach.
Tenants are bound by complex regulations, much more stringent than
those imposed by private landlords. Admission and continued occu-
pancy standards are used as weapons for inculcating middle-class stan-
dards, and as shields for protecting the image of the program. Thus the
New York City Housing Authority excludes applicants who present
a "clear and present danger" to the project,28 and some authorities
evict women tenants who become illicitly pregnant.29 All too often the
main objective of the public housing bureaucracy has become its own
self-preservation. In the words of Ira S. Robbins, vice chairman of the
New York City Housing Authority:
Taking tenants indiscriminately would mean the end of public
housing. It would be disastrous for the people who need it ...
The image of public housing is already very bad, so even though
we think it is a highly successful program we now find it very hard
to get more money and new sites. Therefore, if the image got
worse it would mean the end of the program. 80
The future hope of public housing lies not in its traditional formula,
but in its recent innovations-the program for purchase and rehabil-
itation of existing units ("flexible formula"),"' the Lavanburg plan
involving purchase of an undivided interest in a privately owned
building, and the "turnkey" approach in which private builders develop
new projects and sell them to local authorities.0 2 Another recent, but
perhaps less promising, innovation is the leased housing program.
B. The Widnall Plan
The Widnall Plan,33 called the "leased housing program" by the
PHA, authorizes local housing authorities to pay rent subsidies to
27. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wood, Public Housing and Mrs. McGee, 13 J. or HoustNo 242
(1956). See generally Catherine Bauer Wurster, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing,
Architectural Forum, May, 1957, p. 140.
28. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1966, § 1, p. 47.
29. A. SCaoRa, SLUMS AND SOCAL INsFCUrM 112 (Department of Health, Education
& Welfare Research Report No. 1, 1963).
30. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1966, § 1, p. 47.
31. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 502, 79 Stat. 487, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(c)
(Supp. I, 1965). A PHA Circular dated November 12, 1965, explains its implementation,
32. Hearings on S1354 and Other Pending Bills to Amend the Federal Housing Laws
Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 346, 806-07 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Hearings].
33. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23, 79 Stat. 455, 42 US.C. § 1421(b)
(Supp. I, 1965).
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private landlords on behalf of tenants eligible for admission to public
housing. Enacted in 1965, the Widnall Plan has as yet assisted only
a very few families. By March, 1966, only 81 units were under manage-
ment, although local authorities had filed applications for 6,125 units
with PHA.s4 The program produces no new housing, but simply helps
tenants pay rents on existing units. Much of the benefit redounds to
landlords, who might otherwise have to choose between leaving apart-
ments vacant or lowering the rent. Not surprisingly, the National Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), long the staunchest foe of
public housing, was the main force behind passage of the Widnall
Plan.
Unlike public housing, Widnall Plan units can be located in com-
munities without workable programs; however, the local governing
body must agree to receive the program.35 After obtaining such ap-
proval, the local housing authorities apply to the PHA for the neces-
sary funds. PHA has indicated, quite properly, that it will take into
account the possible inflationary effect on the private market when it
considers applications:
A proposed leasing program which would reduce ... a vacancy
rate to less than 3 per cent for any unit size will not be approved
unless the Local Authority satisfies the PHA that the leasing pro-
gram will not have a substantial inflationary effect on the private
rental market or that the program is justified by the exigencies of
a particular situation, such as a critical immediate need for re-
location housing.3 6
The danger of course is that the leasing program will pinch the supply
of rental housing for people who earn slightly more than public-:hous-
ing families. The housing shortage, however, may often seem more
critical to the PHA than the danger of inflation in low-vacancy areas;
it quickly approved a 500-unit program for New York City,37 where
vacancy rates on average size apartments are closer to 2 per cent. s Once
it has secured its annual contributions contract from PHA, the local au-
thority proceeds to find units of "decent, safe, and sanitary" housing.
The statute cautions the authority to choose no more than 10 per cent
34. PHA WEEKLY REP. oN Acrrvrry, WIzn ENDED MAcI 18, 1966 (Statistics Branch,
March 22, 1966).
35. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 §§ 23(a)(2), 23(f), 79 Stat. 455, 456,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1421(a)(2), 1421(b)(t) (Supp. I, 1965). A "workable program" is defined in
note 54 infra.
36. PHA Circular, October 6, 1965, p. 1.
37. N.Y. Times, January 1, 1966, p. I.
38. N.Y. Times, October 17, 1965, § 8, p. 6.
513
The Yale Law Journal
of the units in any single structure, but they may ignore this require-
ment for any reason.3 9 As a reward for rehabilitation, units which have
been brought up to standard in order to qualify for the program are
supposed to receive special consideration. 40
The local authority enters into one- to three-year leases, renewable
by consent of both parties, at rents which allow the landlord a limited
profit. The difference between the rent and the tenant's contribution
will be paid by the local authority with funds received from PHA
under the annual contributions contract. The amount received from
PHA for the entire project "shall not exceed the amount of the fixed
annual contribution which would be established under this Act for a
newly constructed project by such public housing agency designed to
accommodate the comparable number, sizes, and kinds of families." 41
This fixed amount is calculated under the "flexible formula" of the
third proviso of section 10(c) of the United States Housing Act of 1937,
as amended.42 In addition, the authority may receive up to $120 per
year for each elderly family and certain displaced families. The con-
tributions paid by tenants, together with the annual contribution from
PHA, must be sufficient to cover rents paid to the landlords and ad-
ministrative costs borne by the local authority. Leased units are not
exempt from property taxes, and thus the locality is excused from the
subsidy which it must extend to tax-free public housing units. Because
the total possible subsidy is less, Widnall units will often not present a
realistic housing alternative for the poorest families.
Income limits for tenants are still set by local authorities, but the
twenty per cent gap which protects the private market from public
housing does not apply.43 Tenants are selected under a method speci-
fied in the contract between the landlord and the local authority.44
If the landlord chooses the tenants (subject to local authority's deter-
mination of eligibility), the authority typically will not pay rents when
the apartment is vacant. Otherwise, the authority "insures" the term
of the lease unless the landlord arbitrarily refuses to house tenants
39. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23(c), 79 Stat. 455, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1421b(c) (Supp. I, 1965).
40. See PHA Circular, supra note 36.
41. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23(e), 79 Stat. 456, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1421b(e) (Supp. I, 1965).
42. See note 31 supra.
43. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23(f), 79 Stat. 456, 42 U.s.c,
§ 1421b(f) (Supp. I, 1965).
44. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23(c)(1), 79 Stat. 456, 42 V.,C,
§ 1421b(d)(1) (Supp. I, 1965).
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suggested by the authority.45 The local agency has "sole right to give
notice to vacate, with the owner having the right to make representa-
tions to the agency for termination of a tenancy."'46
C. Below Market Interest Rate Loans Under Section 221(d)(3) of the
National Housing Act (221(d)(3) BMIR)
The Kennedy Administration introduced the 221(d)(3) BMIR4 T
program in 1961 to increase the supply of housing available to families
of moderate income, i.e., those above the income limit for admission
to public housing. The program provides low-interest mortgage loans
from FNMA to sponsors for permanent financing of qualifying projects
which involve either new construction or rehabilitation. FHA insures
these mortgages, without fee, and in return exacts the power to super-
vise project development and operation. During the early years of the
program, interest rates on these loans were computed through a for-
mula based on the average market yield on all outstanding marketable
obligations of the United States.48 By July, 1965, this formula rate had
risen to 4V8 per cent, compared to the FHA market rate of 5% per cent
(including the ;/ per cent insurance fee) existing at that time. But in
August, 1965, Congress greatly increased the subsidy available under
the 221(d)(3) BMIR program by reducing the maximum interest rate
to 3 per cent or the formula rate, whichever is less.A0
To be eligible for BMIR loans under the program, a sponsor must
be a nonprofit, cooperative, or limited-dividend corporation or asso-
ciation, or a federal or state agency other than a local housing author-
ity.50 Section 221(d)(3) BMIR mortgages may exceed neither $12,500,000
in total amount5' nor somewhat stringent per-unit limitations, which
depend on geographical location, the number of bedrooms, etc.;2 Non-
profit, cooperative, and public sponsors may secure mortgages of up to
100% of replacement cost on completion, including land, utilities, and
45. See PHA Circular, October 6, 1965, pp. 4-5.
46. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23(d)(3), 79 Stat. 456, 42 US.C.
§ 1421b(d)(3) (Supp. I, 1965).
47. Housing Act of 1961.75 Stat. 149 (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1964).
48. Housing Act of 1961 § 101(a)(11), 75 Stat. 152, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(5) (1964).
49. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 102(b), 79 Stat. 454, 12 U.S.C.
§ 17151(d)(5) (Supp. 1, 1965).
50. Housing Act of 1961 § 101(a)(6), 75 Stat. 150, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1964); 24
CF.R. § 221.510 (1966).
51. National Housing Act § 221(d)(3)(i), as amended, 75 Stat. 150 (1961), 12 U.S.C
§ 17151(d)(3)(i) (1964); 24 C.F.R. § 221.514(a)(1)(i) (1966).
52. National Housing Act § 221(d)(3)(h), as amended, 75 Stat. 150 (1961), 78 Stat. 775
(1964), 79 Stat. 467 (1965), 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3)(ii) (Supp. I, 1965); 24 C.F.R. § 221.514(a)(1)(ii), (b), (c  (1966)-
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fees incident to construction. The provisions for limited distribution
sponsors are only slightly less generous: mortgage loans of up to 90 per
cent of total project replacement cost, plus a profit allowance of 10 per
cent of replacement cost exclusive of land.5 3
The majority of 221(d)(3) BMIR projects consist of newly con-
structed row-houses and walk-up apartments. They must be located in
communities which have developed a HUD approved "workable pro-
gram for community improvement" 54 -a broader category than cities
with housing authorities. Perhaps as much as half of all 221(d)(3)
BMIR housing is located in urban renewal areas. Local redevelopment
agencies often encourage wary sponsors by obtaining preliminary com-
mitments from FHA on illustrative plans.5 The median 221(d)(3)
BMIR project insured in 1964 had 104 units; rent per unit (exclusive
of cooperatives) was $102; mortgage amount per unit was $12,482; and
the ratio of the mortgage amount to the replacement cost on comple-
tion was 97.9 per cent. 6
Families and single elderly and handicapped persons are eligible
tenants for 221(d)(3) BMIR housing provided that they earn less than
the relevant maximum income limit set by FHA. 7 These limits are
usually several thousand dollars higher than the equivalent limit for
admission to public housing in the same area. In August, 1965, the
maximum income limit for a family of four was $8,200 for New York
City; $6,800 for Wichita, Kansas; and $6,150 for Birmingham, Ala-
bama.58 Probably a majority of American families fall beneath these
income limits. The project owner is solely responsible for tenant
selection. However, in the case of 221(d)(3) BMIR cooperatives, FHA
must approve the credit standing of potential members. Through its
regulatory agreement, FHA retains the power to veto any important
management decisions (e.g., changes in rents) and is authorized to
assume management of the project if the Regulatory Agreement is
broken.
53. National Housing Act § 221(d)(3(iii), as amended, 75 Stat. 150 (1961), 78 Stat. 779
(1964), 12 U.S.C. § 17151(e)(3)(iii) (1964); 24C.F.R. § 221.514(2)(ii) (1966).
54. Housing Act of 1949 § 101(c), as amended, 68 Stat. 623 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c)
(Supp. I, 1965). In theory a "workable program" includes "an official plan of action . . .
for effectively dealing with the problem of urban slums and blight within the community
and for the establishment and preservation of a well-planned community with well-
organized residential neighborhoods of decent homes and suitable living environment
for adequate family life ... ." Ibid.
55. 17 HHFA ANN. RF'. 387 (1963).
56. 18 HHFA ANN. Rn'. 159 (1964).
57. The formula for computing income limits for admission to 221(d)(3) BMIR
housing is described in 1965 House Hearings 266.
58. Maximum Income Limits for Occupancy of § 221(dX3) BMIR Housing, FHA Rr.
No. 748 (August, 1965).
516
Vol. 76: 508, 1967
Government Housing Assistance
Although popular with Congress, the 221(d)(3) BMIR program has
been plagued by a number of problems. Defaults averaged 4 per cent
in the early 1960's, the highest rate under any FHA mortgage insurance
program.59 Then in December, 1965, a Washington Post survey revealed
that many families in 221(d)(3) BMIR projects in the Washington area
had incomes which exceeded the generous income limits for occupancy.
FHA promptly responded with new rules that required a review of
tenant incomes every two years; tenants whose incomes exceed 105 per
cent of the limit must now pay higher rents which exclude them from
the benefits of subsidized financingco Because they involve a high initial
outlay of Treasury funds, FNMA's purchases of BMIR mortgages have
a severe impact on the federal budget. The Johnson Administration
has sought to reduce the budgetary impact by pooling such mortgages,
and by selling participations in the pool to private investors. Premium
interest rates are paid on such participations in order to attract in-
vestors. The federal government then makes up the difference between
the premium rate and the below-market rate with annual appropria-
tions, which in effect "amortize" the budgetary impact. This approach
no doubt diverts some funds from the market for ordinary real estate
mortgages, and may thus contribute to increased costs in private mort-
gage financing.
Most serious of all, the 221(d)(3) BMIR program has failed to gen-
erate much new construction.
MORTGAGES INSURED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION








The program should have done very well in 1965 after the interest rate
had been reduced to a maximum of 8 per cent, as market interest rates
were at an unusually high level in that year. The table shows the num-
59. Testimony of Phillip Brownstein, FHA Commissioner, 1965 Senate Hearings 190.
60. Occupancy Controls in Section 221(dX3) Below Marhet Interest Rate Projects, FHA
Rr. No. MF-67 (January 4, 1966).
61. Sources: Table 111-6, 18 HHFA ANN. REP. 80 (194); FHA Mo.nm.y REP. or
OPERATIONS (Statistics Section, December, 1965).
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ber of units insured actually dropped from 1964 to 1965; other FHA
figures show that applications under the program have not increased
significantly since the amendment in the interest rate. 62 One explana-
tion is that many private sponsors were drawn away from the 221(d)(3)
BMIR program by passage in 1965 of the rent supplement program,
whose more lucrative subsidies are available to most of the same spon-
sors.
D. The Rent Supplement Program
The rent supplement program, section 101 of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965,63 is potentially the most important
development in federal housing policy since the advent of urban re-
newal in 1949. 64 It would shift responsibility for building and operat-
ing low-cost housing from the public sector (public agencies are not
eligible sponsors) to certain "non-profit" and "limited profit" organiza-
tions outside government, such as labor unions, churches, cooperatives,
limited dividend corporations. Although these groups have always
been eligible to sponsor 221(d)(3) BMIR projects, the rent supple-
ments enable private sponsors, for the first time, to construct present-
able new housing that low-income tenants can afford. Thus the
principal purpose of the rent supplement program is to eliminate
local authorities as intermediaries between the welfare recipient and
his patrons in the federal government.
Rent subsidies are government payments which make up the margin
by which rent levels exceed the amount which a tenant can reasonably
be expected to pay for shelter. Under the rent supplement program
the tenant family pays 25 per cent of its income toward rent, and the
federal government pays any remainder directly to the landlord.
1. History of the rent supplement idea6 5
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce first proposed rent subsidies to
Congress, during the 1937 hearings on the public housing program. 00
A year later, the editors of Architectural Forum concluded that rent
subsidies would be the best feasible form of housing assistance, 7 and
62. Id. at 3.
63. 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C. 1701s (Supp. I, 1965).
64. Housing Act of 1949, Title I, as amended, 63 Stat. 414, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451-68
(Supp. I, 1965).
65. For the history of congressional consideration of rent subsidies prior to 1953, ee
THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS,
RECOMMENDATIONS ON GOVERNMENT HOUSING PROGRAMS 323-50 (Comm. Print 1953) [here-
inafter cited as GOVERNMENT HOUSING PROGRAMS].
66. Id. at 323.
67. Subsidies for Housing, 68 Architectural Forum, April, 1938, pp. 309, 515-16.
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in 1943 NAREB, the Realtors' Association, formally endorsed them
as the "straightforward American way of handling this problem."0s
All these early proposals called for subsidies payable on units in exist-
ing housing (like the Widnall Plan), and thus they would not have
added directly to the housing stock. Eisenhower's Advisory Committee
on Government Housing Policies and Programs, after a broad evalua-
tion of federal housing policy, concluded that public housing was
preferable to any rent subsidy program, 9 even one which was keyed
to new construction. Among its objections, few of which seemed to
have much substance, the Committee concluded rent subsidies would
require an administrative apparatus so complex that "the program
would fall of its own weight."7 However, some of the more acute
observers of the urban scene, notably Jane Jacobs, 72 continued to ad-
vocate the use of rent subsidies to induce the private sector to upgrade
neighborhoods.
The federal government began experimenting with rent subsidies
under the Low-Income Housing Demonstration Program of 1961.7
In 1964 Congress devised a rent subsidy formula for relocation pay-
ments to assist families displaced by urban renewal.7 4 The Johnson
Administration's rent supplement proposal of 1965 was the first
attempt to key the subsidy device to new construction and rehabilita-
tion on a large scale.
2. The political history of the rent supplement program
The National Association of Home Builders, whose members had
more than a detached interest in the program, claim to have proposed
the rent supplement approach to President Johnson in 1964.7 The
Administration's bill, as introduced to Congress, restricted eligibility
68. GovERzwNT Housuc PRaORAIIs 324.
69. Id. at 257, 261-64.
70. Id. at 262-63.
71. Id. at 263.
72. JACOBs, THE DEATH AND Lx oF GREAT AmEnicAN Crms 321-37 (Vintage cd., 1961).
See also suggestions by Vernon Demars, in The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing-How
to Break It?, 106 Architectural Forum, June, 1957, pp. 139, 224,226.
73. Housing Act of 1961 § 207, 75 Stat. 165, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1436 (Supp. I,
1965). Nine rent subsidy projects had been begun under this program by September 1965.
Four projects utilized existing housing; three involved new construction of rental units,
and two involved single family units on which participating families obtained options to
purchase, exercisable when they were no longer dependent on rent subsidies. See HHFA,
Low INCOUE HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: PnojECr DmEcron" (September, 1965).
74. Housing Act of 1949 § 114(c)(2), 78 Stat. 789, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1465(c)(2)
(Supp. 1, 1965).
75. Testimony of Perry Willits, President of the National Association of Home
Builders, 1965 House Hearings 548.
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for supplements to families whose incomes were in the "gap" between
the income limits for admission to public housing and 125 per cent of
those limits-i.e., the level at which families can afford standard hous-
ing with 20 per cent of their income.7 6 The President gave the program
active support during its entire journey through Congress, calling it
"[t]he most crucial new instrument in our effort to improve the Ameri-
can city. . .. "7
The original decision to make only a moderately needy group the
beneficiary of the program was based on several considerations. The
Administration was disenchanted with the 221(d)(3) BMIR program,
largely because of its adverse impact on the budget, and announced its
intention to phase out the program after 1969.78 This would create a
vacuum in the area of subsidized housing for families of moderate in-
come. HHFA Commissioner Weaver also doubted that there were
enough private sponsors who would be able and willing to provide
proper management for projects housing low-income families.70 Fi-
nally, it is cheaper for government to supplement the rent of a "gap"
family than a public housing family of the same size. Thus the Admin-
istration could generate more units for its money with a program of
the sort it proposed. HHFA estimated an annual appropriation of
200 million dollars could generate 500,000 units of new housing for
families of moderate income within a four-year period 0 -perhaps 7 per
cent of all new residential units built during that period. The benefit
of this large infusion would then trickle down to relieve the shortage of
standard housing faced by families of low income.
At the hearings on Capitol Hill, most lobbyists supported the rent
supplement concept,"' but many urged that the units be made avail-
able to low-income families rather than families in the "gap" range.82
Lobbying organizations for all the major groups of mortgage lenders
76. H.R. 5840, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(d)(1), reprinted in 1965 House Hearings 2.
77. President's Message to Congress on Housing, reprinted in 1965 House Hearings 72.
78. Ibid.
79. 1965 Senate Hearings 22, 32.
80. President's Message to Congress on Housing, supra note 77.
81. For example, see testimony by representatives of: AFL-CIO, 1965 House Hearings
484; the National Council on Aging, id. at 393; the National Association of Home
Builders, id. at 548; the National Housing Council, id. at 325; and the National Farmer's
Union, id. at 386. In general opposition were such organizations as: the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, id. at 1005; and the National Lumber and Building Materials Dealers
Association, id. at 1110.
82. E.g., The Americans for Democratic Action, id. at 1138; the Cooperative League,
id. at 313; the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, id. at 673; the U.S. Savings and
Loan League, id. at 1123; and the National Amociation of Mutual Savings Banks, 1965
Senate Hearings 588.
520
Vol. 76: 508, 1967
Government Housing Assistance
supported the program,ta which relies primarily on private market
interest rate financing. The opposition came from the two extremes
of the housing lobby. NAREB, the realtors' organization, maintained
its strong opposition to government intervention by announcing that
it would oppose the rent supplement program even if it were restricted
to low-income families.s4 The National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), the professional organization of
local public housing officials, thought the low-income group worthier
of subsidy, but also feared greater costs and inexpert management in
any rent supplement program.8 5 Of course, these local housing officials
were testifying on a program which, if successful, might make their
jobs obsolete.88
Congress followed the advice of most of its witnesses and redirected
the rent supplement program to serve families eligible for public
housing, not those above that level.8 7 Even with this concession, the
rent supplement program survived on the floor of the House by only
six votes. In addition, Congress ignored the Administration's plan to
bury the 221(d)(3) BMIR program and greatly strengthened that
program by reducing the maximum interest rate to 3 per cent.
After failing to get appropriations in 1965,88 the President asked
83. See authorities cited note 82 supra, and testimony of representatives of the
American Bankers Association, 1965 House Hearings 707.
84. 1965 House Hearings 891. The National Association of Real Estate Boards
(NAREB) has since decided to support the program. Statement of Policy, adopted by the
NAREB Delegate Body, Chicago, Nov. 18, 1965, p. 2.
85. See, e.g., statement of Ira S. Robbins, President of NAHRO, 1965 Senate Hearings
324-27.
86. Senator Douglas (Dem., Ill.) concluded their evaluation of the program might
not be entirely objective:
And I may say the public housing people have not liked [the rent supplement pro-
gram] either. They haven't liked the proposal because they want to keep the poor
as their special provinces; "Keep off the grass," they say.
1965 Senate Hearings 525.
87. This change was engineered in the Senate by the Banking and Currency Corn-
mittee, and in the House, by floor approval of the "Stephens Amendment." Note that
elderly, handicapped, and displaced individuals or families in the "gap" income range
were eligible for supplements under the Administration proposal, and are still eligible
under the program as enacted.
88. On September 28, 1965, seven weeks after the 1965 housing legislation had been
signed into law, the FHA distributed to its insuring offices a package of instructions for
implementing the rent supplement program. FHA, REN-r SuPPxrtzimr Procwu PAcxcn
(Sept. 28, 1965). This proved to be a mistake. In October while the President was hospital-
ized, the House rebelled and defeated appropriations for the measure by twenty-three
votes. In leading the attack on funding the program, Rep. James Harvey (Rep., Mich.)
claimed that the September package had betrayed Congress' intent by permitting some
elderly families with assets of up to $25,000 to qualify for supplements. Perhaps of
greater underlying concern was an assertion in the package that the program would be
used affirmatively to promote integration, see text accompanying note 139. The only
concessions the Senate Conferees could force were appropriations of $450,000 to FHA and
$500,000 to the Housing Administrator for preparation of plans for the program, Sup-
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Congress in February, 1966, to appropriate $30 million for rent supple-
ments in fiscal 1966-the full amount of the authorization. The Inde-
pendent Offices Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee cut the figure to $12 million, and, more importantly, added a rider
excluding rent supplement projects from communities that both lack
a workable program, and whose local governing body refuses to ratify
the project. After the "biggest lobbying effort of the year,"' , the Admin-
istration got its $12 million, and the debilitating rider.10
3. The structure of the rent supplement program
The form of the rent supplement program as it will be administered
by HUD and FHA is best outlined in a handbook 1 and a set of regu-
lations92 issued in May, 1966. The new version differs in a number of
details from earlier ones released in September and December of
1965,03 and no doubt will be frequently modified in the future.
(a) Eligible housing owners and their supervision by FHA
Although the statute places operation of the rent supplement pro-
gram under the Secretary of HUD, 4 the Secretary has chosen to dele-
gate most of his powers to the FHA, one of the principal component
agencies of the Department. 5 The Secretary will retain only the pow-
ers to make regional and local allocations of rent supplement funds, to
plemental Appropriation Act for Fiscal 1966, 79 Stat. 1135 (1965), and a statement that
funds for subsidies had been denied without prejudice.
Acting to correct its blunder, the Administration withdrew the September package,
and in December, 1965, issued a new package which gracefully avoided every controversial
issue in the program. Rent Supplement Program, Preliminary Information, FHA Rm%.
No. 2504 (November, 1965); distributed under a covering letter on December 6, 1965.
The December package reduced asset limitations to $5,000 for the elderly, and to $2,000
for others, and eliminated the statement on integration.
89. Tom Wicker, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1966, § 4, p. i.
90. The rider reads:
: * . no part of the foregoing appropriation or contract authority shall be used for
incurring any obligation in connection with any dwelling unit or project which is not
either part of a workable program for community improvement meeting the require,
ments of section 101(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, [added by 68 Stat. 623 (1954)],
as amended (42 U.S.C. § 1451(c)), or which is without local official approval for
participation in this program.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1296 (1966). See 31 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966) adding 24 C.F.R.
§ 5.15(c) (1966).
91. Rent Supplement Program: Public Information Guide and Instruction Handbook,
FHA REP. No. 2504 (May, 1966) [hereinafter cited as MAY HANDBOOK].
92. 31 Fed. Reg. 7563-66 (1966). Most are codified under 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.80 (1966).
93. See note 88 supra.
94. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 §§ 101(a), (e) and (;), 79 Stat. 451,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701s(a), (e) and (g) (Supp. I, 1965). Department of Housing and Urban
Development Act § 5(a), 79 Stat. 669 (1965), 5 U.S.C. § 624c(a) (Supp. I, 1965), transferred
to the Secretary of HUD all the "functions, powers, and duties" of the pre-existing Hous'
ing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) and its Administrator.
95. 31 Fed. Reg. 7565 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. § 200.95(aa).
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establish income ceilings for geographical areas, and to conduct surveys
to determine aggregate need for housing in various areas. °0 FHA has
traditionally maintained close ties with the lenders and builders in the
housing industry, and is almost totally without experience in programs
involving housing for low-income families. Nevertheless the choice of
FHA to administer the program seems proper. FHA's ties with the
private sector are a great asset since the success of the program is en-
tirely dependent on the enthusiasm of private developers. Moreover,
the only other existing agency capable of handling the program, PHA,
could hardly be expected to give enthusiastic support to a program
which preempts the role of the PHA's constituent local housing author-
ities.
A rent supplement project begins when a private sponsor applies to
a local FHA insuring office. The sponsor (or "housing owner") must
be either a private nonprofit organization,17 a limited dividend mort-
gagor, or a cooperative housing corporation. Public mortgagors are not
eligible for sponsorship. Final approval for a project must come from
the appropriate FHA regional office. A would-be sponsor can appeal an
unfavorable decision by the local insuring office within the agency, and
ultimately in the courts, although the final step is extremely unlikely.
Sponsors are judged by the agency for integrity, motivation, continu-
ity, and expertise. A particularly important consideration will be the
capacity of the sponsor to provide, or hire, management competent to
administer a project housing primarily low-income tenants.0D There is
always some danger that another qualification will be the sponsor's
political connections.
FHA enters into three principal contracts with the housing owner
of an approved project. First, FHA insures the mortgage on the project
under the 221(d)(3) market interest rate program. 100 Most primary
96. MAY HAJDBOOr 1.
97. For example, a religious, labor or public service organization.
98. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(b), 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(b) (Supp. I, 1965). 31 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.15.
99. MAY HANDBOOK 2-3.
100. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(b), 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(b) (Supp. I, 1965), referring to 75 Stat. 150 (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 1715€ (1964), as
amended, 79 Stat. 505, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (Supp. I, 1965). 31 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966),
adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.15(a). For experimental purposes a few projects insured under the
§ 221(d)(3) BMIR, market interest rate elderly, and below-market interest rate elderly,
mortgage insur__ance pro~will qualify for rent supplements. Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965 § 101(j), 79 Stat. 453, 12 U.S.C. § 1701(h) (Supp. 1, l965). 31
Fed. R eg. 7564 (1966), adding 24 CX.R. § 5.15(b). See 73 Stat. 665, 667 1959), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1715v(c)(3), 1701q (1964) (market interest rate elderly and below-market interest rate
elderly programs); 75 Stat. 150 (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1964), as amended, 79 Stat. 505,
12 U.S.C. § 17151 (Supp. I, 1965) (221(d)(3) BMIR program).
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mortgagees will be private lenders. Rent supplement projects are
eligible for FNMA special assistance and FNMA is authorized to
purchase appropriate mortgages on these projects through its normal
secondary market operations. Except in experimental cases, 101 the
mortgages will bear the FHA market interest rate for multi-family
mortgages, which, in April, 1966, was an unusually high 5V2 per cent.10 -"
The mortgagor, in addition to his interest payments to the mortgagee,
pays FHA an annual mortgage insurance premium equal to 1/2 per cent
of the declining balance due on the mortgage. 10 3 Mortgages may not ex-
ceed $12,500,000 in amount, 04 nor forty years in term. 05 Loan-to-value
ratios will be the same as under the 221(d)(3) BMIR program; for
example, FHA will insure loans to nonprofit sponsors up to 100 per cent
of the replacement cost of the project on completion. If the housing
owner defaults on its mortgage payments, FHA pays off the mort-
gagee 06 in cash and/or debentures, 0 7 and, in effect, takes over manage-
ment of the project, through hired agents, until the property or the
mortgage on it can be sold.
The second principal document is the Regulatory Agreement be-
tween FHA and the housing owner which sets out FHA's powers to
supervise the operation of the project. The Regulatory Agreement
typically requires that the housing owner clear the rents it charges with
the FHA, maintain certain reserves, and keep its books and building
in satisfactory condition. 08 In addition, FHA must approve the hous-
ing owner's choice of a management agent. Projects will be inspected
at least once a year by FHA officials to assure proper management and
physical maintenance. Breach of the Regulatory Agreement constitutes
a default on the mortgage which empowers FHA to require the mort-
gagee to demand that the mortgagor accelerate payments. 00
In the third document, a rent supplement contract,11 0 FHA promises
to make monthly rent supplement payments to the housing owner on
behalf of his eligible tenants for a term equal to the term of the project
mortgage. This long term, usually forty years, is necessary to insulate
101. See authorities cited note 100 supra.
102. 31 Fed. Reg. 5757 (1966), amending 24 C.F.R. § 221.518(a) (1966).
103. 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.755, 207.252(d) (1966).
104. See note 51 supra.
105. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(a), 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.s.C,§ 1701s(a) (Supp. I, 1965).
106. See generally, 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.751, 221.762-.790, 207.255-.259 (1966).
107. 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.762, 207.259 (1966).
108. See generally, 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.529-.535a (1966).
109. 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.751, 207.255-.257 (1966).
110. For a sample rent supplement contract, see FHA FoaRa No. 2503.
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housing owners from possible changes in federal policy which would
otherwise deter them from undertaking these projects. FHA can termi-
nate the contract if the housing owner violates either it, or the Regu-
latory Agreement, or makes false representations."'
The rent supplement program gives the entrepreneur many op-
portunities to make a legal limited profit. Rents in nonprofit and
cooperative projects are limited by FHA to an amount sufficient, at
93 per cent occupancy, to cover operating costs, debt service, and re-
serves. Limited distribution mortgagors, however, are entitled to charge
rents which will allow them a profit of up to six per cent on their own
investment.11 The possibility for profit may induce some entrepre-
neurs to sponsor rent supplement projects, since the availability of
supplements greatly reduces risks of loss or reduced profit. However,
there are other strong financial incentives which are present irrespec-
tive of the type of sponsorship. When the mortgage has been retired,
the sponsor owns the project free and clear of FHA regulation. In
addition, builders, materialmen, lawyers, architects, management
firms, building trade unions, and others can earn a normal profit on
extra business by providing goods and services to rent supplement
projects. For example, a builder seeking to increase his volume would
obviously be attracted to this program.
Illegal profits are likely to be a serious problem. FHA programs for
insurance of mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios have always
appealed to those who are inclined to defraud the government.113 They
require the entrepreneur to put up little risk capital, and give him an
opportunity, without proper supervision, to "mortgage out"--that is,
make no out-of-pocket investment at all. The principal danger during
the construction period is that the sponsor will pad his costs and accept
kickbacks from suppliers. As a preventive measure, FHA requires all
sponsors to certify costs" 4 and to contract on a cost-plus basis with
builders who are not at arm's length from them.15 Sweetheart con-
tracts are also possible after construction has been completed. The
sponsor may pay lucrative fees to a management firm in identity of
interest with him. The problem arises because there are few market
pressures to deter such behavior. So long as there are sufficient supple-
111. Ibid.
112. 24 C.F.R. § 221.532 (1966).
113. See HAAR, FEDRAL CREDrr AND PRIVATE HousNG 260-66; AAIss, Tim Cm" is TH
FRONTmR 87-90 (1965).
114. 24 C.F.,. §§ 221.547-.558 (1966).
115. 24 C.F.R. § 221.548(c) (1966).
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ment funds available, the sponsor is indifferent to increased costs.
High rents do not drive away subsidized tenants, since they pay only
25 per cent of their income for rent regardless. FHA and the tenants not
receiving supplements bear the entire cost of illegal practices. In co-
operatives, the problem is more acute; subsidized members have little
reason not to vote for every proposed expenditure. In all these cases,
the remedy is sharp scrutiny by FHA, but there are so many oppor-
tunities for abuse that it would be foolhardy to expect FHA to keep
the program free of scandal.
(b) Computation of rent supplement payments
FHA's monthly payments under the rent supplement contract are
made directly to the housing owner. The amount paid equals the sum
of the supplements due on behalf of all the eligible tenants in the
project, unless that sum exceeds the project maximum explained be-
low. A tenant's supplement equals the difference between the rent
payable on his apartment and 1/4 of his family's income.'" 0 Twenty-five
per cent is an unusually high portion of income for a family to spend
on housing. Alvin Schorr has suggested that 20 per cent is a more
realistic limit."17
Although the housing owner is entirely responsible for collecting
the tenant's share of the rent, FHA continues to pay supplements on
behalf of tenants who default on their contribution. No supplements
are payable, however, on vacant units. All tenants are required to
report permanent increases in income which end their eligibility for
supplements118 to the housing owner, and nonelderly tenants must
have their incomes recertified annually, so their supplements can be
recomputed. 19 If a tenant's income drops after initial occupancy, he
must persuade both the housing owner 120 and FHA'21 that he should
receive an increased supplement.
To make budgeting easier, FHA sets a maximum supplement for
the project as a whole after a short introductory rent-up period. Hous-
ing owners will find it advantageous to start off with very low income
tenants, thus increasing their project maximum. The original compu-
tation of the maximum project payment under the contract will
116. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(d), 79 Stat. 452, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(d) (Supp. I, 1965).
117. Scaoxm, op. cit. supra note 29, at 101-02.
118. MAY HANDBOOK 12.
119. 31 Fed. Reg. 7565 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. 5.55. See also Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965 § 101(d)(2), 79 Stat. 452, 12 U.S.C. § 1701s(d)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
120. MAY HANDBOOK 13.
121. 31 Fed. Reg. 7565 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. 5.60.
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include a 10 per cent contingency allowance. 22 If this allowance is ex-
hausted, tenants who suffer reductions in income will be unable to get
increased supplements, and the housing owner may not have enough
supplements available to attract new low-income tenants. The rent
supplement contract can be reopened and the project maximum re-
negotiated upward, but only if FHA has unallocated rent supple-
ment funds available. Thus housing owners will try to maintain a
margin of safety between the total of individual tenant supplements
computed under the 25 per cent formula and the project maximum.
(c) Eligible tenants
Housing owners, or their management agents, are responsible for
tenant selection, and "can evict tenants for violation of lease provisions
as permitted by local or state laws."'m To be eligible for supplements,
however, a tenant must meet three requirements: (1) an income limita-
tion; (2) an asset limitation, and (3) a "categorical" requirement. The
statutory income limits are identical to those applicable to public
housing.1 -2 4 To be brief, they vary with the size of family and geograph-
ical location, and depend further on whether the 20 per cent gap re-
quirement is inapplicable because the tenant is elderly, handicapped, or
displaced by government action. Local housing authorities, it will be
recalled, often set their own limits for admission well below the statu-
tory formula. The Secretary of HUD, who has retained the power to
set income limits for admission to rent supplement projects, has chosen
not to let rent supplement limits exceed public housing limits in the
same locality. 5
In May, 1966, the income limit for a family of four was $5,760 for
New York City, and $3,600 for both Witchita, Kansas and Birming-
ham, Alabama.2 6
Rent supplement projects are not subject, however, to the income
limits for continued occupancy that help to make unstable commu-
nities of public housing projects. While local housing authorities
ultimately evict tenants whose incomes rise above 125 per cent of the
income limit for admission, such prospering tenants are permitted to
stay on in rent supplement projects. They simply lose part, or all, of
their supplement.
2 7
122. 31 Fed. Reg. 7565 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. 5.40.
125. MAY HANDBOOK 13.
124. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(c)(1), 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(c)(1) (Supp. 1, 1965).
125. MAY HANDBOOK at last two printed pages.
126. Ibid.
127. 31 Fed. Reg. 7565 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.80.
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In one sense, the income limits are wholly unnecessary. HUD could
have relied solely on the 25 per cent formula to prevent middle-income
tenants from benefiting from the subsidy available. But the income
limits set by the Secretary do help prevent rent supplement projects
from competing with the private market for middle-income families.
By restricting admission on a supplement basis to low-income families
who are hardly served at all by the market in new housing, the pro-
gram probably adds more net units to the housing stock.
The asset limitation, the second requirement for admission, was
made much stricter, after the generous September limits almost
killed the program in Congress. The maximum net worth permissible
is $5,000 for the elderly and $2,000 for all other tenants. 12 Furniture
and personal effects are not to be counted. 129 FHA pronouncements
do not yet reveal what happens to a tenant whose assets, after his ad-
mission, rise above these figures. He might lose his eligibility for sup-
plements, or if a reasonable formula were devised, forfeit only part of
his supplement.
The third requirement is satisfied if the tenant fits in any of the
following categories: 30 (1) displaced by governmental action; (2) at
least 62 years of age; (3) physically handicapped; (4) lives in substan-
dard housing,' 3' or (5) occupies living units destroyed or extensively
damaged by natural disaster. These are all reasonable distinctions to
apply given a permissive income limitation that creates many more
eligible applicants than there is room for in projects. The danger of
narrowing the class of tenants eligible for subsidy is that potential
sponsors may be deterred from building projects by fear of insufficient
demand for supplemented units. In the immediate future this is likely
to be an academic problem as most communities are well supplied
with families which meet all three requirements for admission to proj-
ects on a supplement basis.
The housing owner is free to admit to the project tenants who do
not qualify for supplements. Such tenants, of course, must pay the
entire rent themselves. The proportion of families receiving supple-
ments will vary substantially from project to project. Only projects
with large supplement maximums will be able to house mostly sub.
sidized tenants.
128. 81 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.20(a)(2) and (3).
129. MAY HANDBOOK 11.
130. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(c)(2), 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(c)(2) (Supp. I, 1965).
181. This provision might have the ironic effect of encouraging low-income families
to move into substandard housing in order to become eligible for supplements.
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Prospective tenants will be assisted by the housing owner in filling
out their applications for eligibility for supplements. Applications are
then forwarded to local FHA offices for final review of eligibility
under the income, asset, and categorical requirements.132 FHA will
require annual recertifications from all tenants except the elderly.
Applicants who succumb to the obvious temptation to cheat are open
to criminal prosecution for fraudulent misrepresentation.a3 During
the hearings, HHFA Administrator Robert Weaver predicted that
nosy neighbors would provide a practical check on tenants who hide
their wealth. 34 This method would give a rent supplement project all
the communal virtues of a partnership whose members report each
other's tax evasions.
(d) Tenant selection and integration within rent supplement projects
Housing owners will have discretion in choosing among eligible
tenants, subject only to covenants in the Regulatory Agreement against
discrimination on account of race, color, creed, or national origin, or
presence of children. They may evict tenants as permitted by state or
local law, and more important, can arbitrarily refuse to renew leases.
This delegation of the power to choose the beneficiaries of govern-
mental subsidies invites abuse. Nepotism, and political, ethnic, and
religious discrimination will probably all occur to some degree; and
none of them will be easy for FHA to prove. The most common use of
racial classifications will no doubt be unwritten benign quotas de-
signed to promote racial integration. The current administration of
HUD would probably not find such action a breach of the covenant of
nondiscrimination. How the courts would handle this uncomfortable
issue is another question.
If rent supplement projects successfully integrate different economic
groups, it will be in spite of the fact that they are more expensive for
unsubsidized tenants than comparable private housing. The manage-
ment will be encouraged to supply social services to his low-income
tenants; and the cost will be reflected in the rent. How many people
would pay this premium to live in rent supplement housing without
a deep personal attachment to a particular project? If rent supplement
projects were financed with BMIR mortgages (as an experimental 5-10
per cent of the units built under the 1965 Act will bel 3 ) there would
132. MAY HANDBOOK 11.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
134. 1965 House Hearings 263.
135. See note 100 supra.
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be an economic incentive for over-income tenants to stay. HUD could
also achieve greater integration by encouraging rent supplement pro-
posals which involve community facilities shared with middle-income
projects constructed concurrently by the same sponsor.
In addition, after the maximum supplement for the project is set,
housing owners will find it in their interest to take the richest and most
stable of the eligible applicants. This group will cause fewer manage-
ment problems, default less often on their rents, and generally make
the project more attractive to the community and the other tenants.
The housing owner will also want to keep a margin of safety between
the sum of the individual supplements and the maximum project
supplement. These two factors-the exodus of the wealthy and the
conservative bias of the housing owner-will tend to produce projects
inhabited mainly by lower-middle-income families (and low-income
elderly) with relatively few disturbing social problems.
(e) The location of projects, and the integration of neighborhoods
One great virtue of the rent supplement program, as originally
enacted, was its freedom from the geographical limitations that con-
strain other forms of federal housing assistance. Unlike public housing,
rent supplement projects were not dependent on the existence of a
local housing authority; and unlike 221(d)(3) projects, they were
not restricted to communities with HUD-approved "workable pro-
grams."1 36 Thus the program opened up communities which, if left
to their own devices, would never make affirmative efforts to provide
housing for low-income families. In particular, the rent supplement
projects could be located on the comparatively cheap land available at
the urban fringe, thus aiding in the deghettoization of the central
cities and of their suburbs. The appropriation bill rider seriously
crippled the program's capacity to achieve this goal. Nevertheless the
rider still permits projects to be built in fringe areas whose govern-
ments have passed "workable programs," or who have explicitly as.
sented to them.
But rent supplement projects will by no means be located exclu-
sively in "suburban" locations. Projects may be located in any area
186. Housing Act of 1949 § 101(c), 68 Stat. 623 (1954) (first proviso), as amended,
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(0, 79 Stat. 453, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c)
(first proviso) (Supp. I, 1965). However, a community which has once received urban
renewal or public housing assistance cannot be the site of a rent supplement project
unless it has an active workable program. Ibid. At the end of 1966 over 1400 localities had
failed to keep their workable programs active. HHFA, STATUS REPORT: Tut WoRCADLE.
PROGRAM FOR COAMMUNrrY IMPROVEMENT (Dec. 31, 1966).
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which a HUD survey finds to have an inadequate supply of low-cost
housing.137 For example, churches and private schools in central cities
threatened by surrounding blight may sponsor projects designed to
upgrade their immediate neighborhoods. In addition, urban renewal
areas make excellent sites for projects.
Rent supplements are the only practical means through which a
New Town developer can provide low-cost housing in his community.
Of course, a developer might choose to construct such housing volun-
tarily, either to create a labor pool for local unskilled jobs or to achieve
what he believes to be a desirable social balance. Thus far, however,
the social vision of New Town developers has been clouded by the
prospect of a middle-class flight from the community at the first sign
of a low-income settlement. The federal government might make
future aid to New Towns contingent on their providing some housing
for low-income families. As a last example, smaller communities may
opt to use rent supplement projects where they had formerly relied on
public housing. Thus voters in two Iowa towns reportedly defeated
proposed public housing projects in recent referenda because of the
availability of rent supplements. 38
But if middle-class suburbs are not the only sites for rent supplement
activity, they are the places where projects will be most controversial.
Communities that fear the end of class homogeneity can be expected
to fight rent supplement projects through political pressure at the
federal level, and through such legal devices as restrictive zoning,
stringent enforcement of building codes, and hostile use of the power
of eminent domain. In fact the rider on the appropriation bill means
that these communities have already won a major victory.
There is no doubt that HUD planned to use the rent supplement
program to break up the ghettos. The short-lived September package
declared that HUD would consider a proposed project's "contribution
to assisting in integrating income groups and furthering the legal
requirements and objectives of equal opportunity in housing."'13
There is no evidence that HUD has abandoned this intention. But the
integration that is likely to occur by means of rent supplement projects
will hardly turn a Shaker Heights into an East New York. Housing
owners will tend to admit families who will create few social difficulties
in the project and in the neighborhood. Suburban projects should
137. MAY HANDBooK 4, 5.
138. National Association of Real Estate Boards, The Rent Supplement Program,
internal memorandum, Jan. 17, 1966.
139. Rent Supplement Program Package, FHA MF LLrE No. 63 (Sept. 28, 1965).
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prove popular with eligible tenants who are not slum-dwellers at all,
but rather middle-class pensioners of low income. Moreover, residents
of the ghetto, while dissatisfied with their miserable living conditions,
may not want to move very far from the central city.140 By leaving for
the suburbs they would lose valuable services and would have to do
without decent public transportation. In addition, the ghetto offers
a style of life which many of its inhabitants find more appealing than
suburban living.141
(f) Structural and legal forms of rent supplement projects
Most rent supplement projects will be newly constructed. Vastly
rehabilitated projects can also qualify, 42 but HUD has indicated that
it will approve few of them during the first few years of the program. 4 3
New construction on vacant sites increases the total housing stock as
well as the supply of standard housing. Rehabilitation achieves only
the second objective, although it is often the most efficient way to
improve a low-cost housing stock of adequate size. Therefore, the
priority of new construction is probably appropriate wherever a gen-
eral housing shortage exists.
Any type of residential structure may qualify as a rent supplement
project, but most units will probably be built as row-houses or garden
apartments, rather than high-rise apartments. 44 FHA will establish
per-unit mortgage limitations for each locality to assure "modest" de-
sign.14 5 "Swimming pools, two bathrooms per unit, air conditioning,
and similar items will not be permitted."' 46 Rent supplement projects
will probably rank in architectural quality somewhere between recent
public housing projects and 221(d)(3) BMIR projects.
Cooperative projects will face special problems. Members will have
to make small initial down payments to provide the cooperative with
working capital. As members' equities increase over the years, mem-
berships in these cooperatives would become prohibitively expensive
for most low-income families if the ownership interests were directly
transferable.
140. FOOTE, ABU LUGHAD, FOLEY & 'WINNIcK, HOUSING CHOICE AND HOUSING CONSTRAINTS
123-24 (1960).
141. See MEYERSON & BANFImL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 31.
142. 31 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966), adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.10; MAY HANDBOOK 9.
143. Testimony of HHFA Administrator Robert Weaver, 1965 House Hearings 249;
1965 Senate Hearings 20.
144. See MAY HANDBOOK 2: "Generally, because of higher construction costs, elevator
buildings will be feasible only if the community provides long term real estate tax
abatement and/or land costs are reduced by write-down or donation."
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 2.
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Consequently the statute requires departing members who have
received subsidies to sell their membership to the cooperative itself at
a price equal to their equity less their equity increment accumulated
through rent supplements. 47 This permits sale of cooperative mem-
berships to new members at lower prices.
Some units will be built under a lease-with-option-to-purchase
scheme 1 patterned after an experimental project in Tulsa, Okla-
homa.149 Such projects will usually consist of groups of single-family
homes, or row-houses, leased by tenants receiving supplements and
covered by a blanket mortgage. Tenants whose incomes have risen
sufficiently can choose to spin off their unit from the project, and to
purchase it, without subsidy, under an individual mortgage insured
under section 203 of the National Housing Act.1 0 In a few cases,
tenants will be able to spin off units in garden apartment structures,
and purchase them as condominiums. Only tenants who demonstrate
capacity for potential home-ownership will be chosen as original ten-
ants for such projects. 11
The success of the cooperative, condominium, and lease-with-option-
to-purchase aspects of the rent supplement program will be of great
interest. They represent the first serious effort by the federal govern-
ment to bring the Jeffersonian dream of "homeownership" within the
reach of low-income families. Desire for homeownership is as strong
among these families as it is in any economic class. 1i2 Under none of
these plans, however, do the supplements aid the "homeowner" in
building up disposable equity in his unit. Congress did apparently not
want the "homeowner" to receive a large liquid windfall from the
government.
(g) Termination
A housing owner cannot sell or refinance his project without the
consent of the FHA Commissioner.1 3 Thus a project might continue
to receive supplements for the entire term of the mortgage and its con-
current rent supplement contract. Neither the statute nor the FHA
pronouncements shed any light on the important question of who gets
147. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(c), 79 Stat. 452, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(c) (Supp. I, 1965). 31 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966. adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.30(a).
148. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(e)(3). 79 Stat. 452, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(e)(3) (Supp. I, 1965); MAY HAIDBooK 14.
149. 1965 Senate Hearings 45-46, 127-29.
150. 48 Stat. 1248 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (Supp. I, 1965).
151. See 31 Fed. Reg. 7564 (1966). adding 24 C.F.R. § 5.25(b).
152. Foom, et al., op. cit. supra note 140, at 187-93.
153. See 31 Fed. Reg. 7566 (1966) , adding 24 C.F.R. § 221.524(a).
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what when the mortgage has been retired. Under its ordinary regu-
latory agreements, the mortgagor is freed from FHA's controls at that
point, since the FHA is no longer securing his debt. If this is true in
the case of rent supplement projects, the project owner receives pre-
cisely the windfall that the government withholds from subsidized
tenants in co-ops, condominiums, or Tulsa-type projects. Although the
building itself may be obsolete, and not worth much more than the
cost of wrecking it, the land below should be quite valuable. To obtain
this benefit the housing owner had to put up very little capital and,
because of the supplements, exposed himself to only a small risk of loss.
The availability of a windfall sometime in the twenty-first century is
probably unnecessary to attract sponsors today. The other incentives
should be sufficient. Consequently FHA ought to limit the housing
owner's rights on expiration of the rent supplement contract. For ex-
ample, FHA could obtain an option to purchase at a reduced price,
or an option to renew the contract and its powers of supervision under
the Regulatory Agreement. Such measures would reduce the costs of
the program to the federal government and prevent empire building
by sponsors.
4. Progress under the rent supplement program
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 authorized the
Secretary of HUD and his delegates to negotiate rent supplement con-
tracts involving, by July 1968, up to $150 million a year in payments
to housing owners.154 If all the contracts had terms of forty years, the
potential long-run cost of the program would be 56 billion. Gradual
increases in tenant incomes might reduce the total paid over a forty-
year period by a third or a fourth of that amount. Congress appropri-
ated only $12 million for fiscal 1966.155 The Department estimates
that $12 million will be sufficient to generate 20,000 units of housing.1
This works out to an average supplement of $50 a month for each
eligible family.
By the end of March, 1966, sponsors of 561 rent supplement projects
had filed applications with FHA. 57 The applications involved 97,983
units, more units than were involved in all applications received under
the 221(d)(3) BMIR program since its start in 1961. About half the
154. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101(a), 79 Stat. 451, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s(a) (Supp. 1, 1965).
155. Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 80 Stat. 141 (1966); 1966 U.S. Coni,
CONG. & AD. NEws 1296.
156. N.Y. Times, October 20, 1965, p. 32.
157. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1966, § 4, p. 3.
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sponsors were limited distribution mortgagors, and half, coopera-
tive and nonprofit organizations.r s This "dramatic and positive re-
sponse"'159 was not entirely spontaneous. HUD drummed up as many
applications as possible to prove to Congress that the private sector
would support the program. Also, the appropriations bill rider may
have washed out a large fraction of these applications. Nevertheless,
the rent supplement program seems to have validated its major as-
sumption. It has succeeded in attracting many private entrepreneurs
to the task of providing new housing for low-income families.
II. Standards for Evaluating Housing Programs
A. Assistance to the Poor
Federal housing programs redistribute income by subsidizing hous-
ing costs for selected recipients. The theory of almost all redistributive
programs is that poor people deserve subsidies, in cash or in kind,
either because they are the victims of imperfections in the labor market
or simply because their incomes will not support an acceptable stan-
dard of living. In the case of housing assistance, there are additional
reasons for directing subsidies to low-income families; for it is poor
people who seem to be the least effective consumers of housing. The
poor generally have little bargaining power and are often victims of
unfair selling practices-principally fraud, coercion, and contracts of
adhesion. Their lack of education or access to information obscures the
full range of choices available to them. Also a disproportionate num-
ber of low-income families are nonwhite and therefore are confined by
real estate selling practices to ghettos where this restriction on their
freedom of movement is reflected in higher rents. Housing assistance
to low-income families, although it does not achieve perfect, or even
near perfect, resource allocation, may offer rough compensation for
these disadvantages in the marketplace.
Of the programs considered, the 221(d)(3) BMIR program clearly
provides the least direct assistance to the poor, although it may help
them indirectly through the trickling process. The maximum income
limits for tenants in 221(d)(3) BMIR buildings are often generous
enough to admit half the families in a city. There is little correlation
between financial need and the size of the subsidy a family receives.
The other three programs primarily benefit low-income families.
Despite their low-income limits for admission, public housing or
158. President's Special Message to Congress on Improving Nation's Cities, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1966, p. 20.
159. Ibid.
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rent supplement projects have far too few spaces available to house all
qualified applicants. Subsidies are allocated among the eligible families
either through statutory preferences (e.g., for old people or veterans)
or local administrative rules. The income criteria are thus modified to
favor certain families (say, a blind, elderly couple displaced by urban
renewal) while other families-perhaps less able to purchase decent
housing-remain on the waiting list. For some categories of recipients
there are good reasons for departing from a strictly financial standard
of admission: for example, nonwhites who are discriminated against
in the private housing market, or families whose poverty is probably
permanent (the handicapped, the elderly, or unwed mothers with
children): Giving preference to families living in substandard housing
may facilitate clearance operations. But it is more difficult to justify
subsidies going to other favored groups, e.g., veterans,100 when there
are other, poorer applicants available. When a relatively high income
limitation simply gives discretion to the landlord or administrator, his
selection of tenants is likely to reflect his social prejudice or an aver-
sion to "troublemakers," and the most needy families are likely to be
left out.
The public housing program may produce the best record of ad-
ministrative discretion within the terms of a statute that provides an
excess of eligible applicants. Most housing authorities set local income
limits below the level prescribed in the statute. Although the local
authorities usually try to screen out "difficult" tenants, their selections
are on the whole a truly destitute group, as indicated by a median an-
nual income of $2,575 in September, 1965.101 The most prominent bias
in the public housing program is its solicitude for old people, who are
the exclusive occupants of half the recent additions to the public hous-
ing stock.
The rent supplement legislation prescribes certain preferences
through the categorical requirement, but these rules still leave room
for wide discretion-a freedom managers of rent supplement units
share with Widnall Plan and 221(d)(3) BMIR landlords. The manager
can be expected to prefer applicants who are financially and socially
stable in order to minimize management headaches. Nonprofit owners
may select a somewhat needier group of tenants. However, because of
the financial interdependence between their members, cooperatives
160. Local housing authorities are required to give preferential treatment to veterans
who apply for admission to public housing projects. United States Housing Act of 1957§ 10(g)(2), as amended, 75 Stat. 164 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(2) (1964).
161. See note 24 supra.
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may prove to be the least generous in their admission policies. If
private groups are delegated the power to choose the recipients of
federal housing subsidies, their discretion should be limited through
a narrow definition of the class of eligibles. Housing owners of 221(d)(3)
BMIR projects, for example, now have scandalously broad discretion
in choosing tenants. If private groups abuse the power of tenant selec-
tion, this power should be taken away from them and vested in local
public agencies or, at last resort, in local FHA offices.1 12
B. Cost Per Unit Added to the Housing Stock
Cost-per-unit-subsidized is usually an unreliable index of the effec-
tiveness of a government assistance program. Cheap subsidies may
simply reflect low-quality service or a choice of recipients who need
little help. But in the case of housing programs, there are reasons for
choosing subsidy techniques that create acceptable new housing units
as cheaply as possible. So long as there is some interplay between dif-
ferent sectors of the housing market, an addition to the stock of hous-
ing relieves prices for everyone. Therefore, the housing program which
on a given budget creates the largest number of new units probably
assists low-income families in related submarkets even when they are
not its direct beneficiaries.
Moreover, there is evidence that the capital market consistently un-
derestimates the return on investment in housing and that as a result
there is a general underallocation of resources to housing construction.
The FHA and FNMA programs, which were designed to undertake
risks that scared off private investors, have yielded regular profits for
the government.' 63 It is possible that the FHA, because of its large
scale of operations, is able to bear risks profitably that are too big for
any private lender. That alternative, however, merely points to another
imperfection of the capital market for housing-an atomized struc-
ture with undersized units that are unable either to coordinate their
activities, or to undertake productive risks individually. If it is true
that private industry adds new units to the housing stock at an insuffi-
cient rate, it is the business of government to correct the shortage,
preferably as cheaply as possible.
Groups within the housing industry and government have made an
astonishing number of unsubstantiated claims about the relative costs
of these programs. There has never been a thorough comparison of
162. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § l0l(e)(3), 79 Stat. 452, 12 U.S.C.5 1701s(e)(3) (Supp. I, 1965).
163. 18 HHFA ANN. REP. 178, 284, 290-91 (1964).
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their costs. At a minimum, analysis would have to account for differ-
ences in available sites, design quality, financing methods, cost of pro-
gram administration, cost of project management, cost of tax exemp-
tions, profit allowances, probabilities of illegal profits, availability of
accelerated depreciation to the sponsor, and external economies and
diseconomies.
Nevertheless, rough estimates are not impossible. The 221(d)(3)
BMIR program without question costs the government less per unit
than the other three programs. Under typical conditions, say a $12,000
per unit mortgage for a term of forty years, and a prevailing govern-
ment borrowing rate of 6 per cent, the maximum cost of the liberal fi-
nancing is $23 per unit per month. The total cost to government is
slightly greater, because of its administrative expenses and its assump-
tion of the risk of loss. It is also necessary to take into account the ad-
ditional housing that might have been constructed privately if there
had been no BMIR program.
The public housing program is probably the most expensive of the
four on a per unit basis, at least when all of its principal subsidies are
considered. The average monthly federal contribution to a public
housing unit built in 1965 is about $60.164 To this one must add the
cost of the tax exemption on its bonds, the cost to the local government
of the exemption of the project from property taxes (less the in-lieu
payment), and the administrative costs of PHA. Local authorities may
ultimately recoup some of the total cost by selling the projects and
their sites. Of course, public housing assists a much poorer class of
tenants than the BMIR program.
Rent supplements should cost significantly less per unit than public
housing. Owners of rent supplement projects will tend to select a
substantially wealthier group of tenants and these tenants will pay
25 per cent of their incomes for rent, instead of the 20 per cent or there-
abouts charged tenants in public housing projects. The more stable
composition of the residents will result in savings in management ex-
penses. As a result tenants in rent supplement projects will bear a
significantly greater fraction of project operating costs. As mentioned,
HUD has estimated the average per-unit subsidy during the early years
of the rent supplement program at $50 per month.
The Widnall Plan, which subsidizes rents in apartments in existing
buildings, does not improve the housing stock in any significant re-
spect. Therefore, even if this leasing program had a lower per-unit
164. NAHRO statement, 1965 Senate Hearings 342.
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cost than the others, it would not necessarily be preferable to them.
As it is, because of its decentralized administration the Widnall Plan's
per-unit costs may not prove to be substantially less than the cost of
public housing.
G. Eliminating External Diseconomieslu5
At one time improved housing was regarded as a panacea for urban
social disorders. Take, for example, this assertion by Gunnar Myrdal
in 1944:
... [A]ny common sense evaluation will tell us that the causation,
in part, goes from poor housing to bad moral, mental, and physi-
cal health.' 66
Or Myres S. McDougal's and Addison A. Mueller's reference in 1942
to:
... the well documented facts that slum clearance and the provi-
sion of sanitary, low-rent housing decrease danger of epidemics,
raise general public health, reduce crime, cut juvenile delin-
quency, reduce immorality, lower economic waste by reducing
health, police, and fire protection costs, make better citizens,
eliminate fire hazards, increase general land values in the vicinity,
cut the accident rate, and prevent the cancerous spread of the
slums to uninfected areas.'67
Soon, however, social scientists realized that these estimates of the
external diseconomies of substandard housing were greatly exag-
gerated. 68 The "well documented facts" had been based on studies
which had merely found correlations, not causation, between slum
housing and social infirmities. 6 9
165. See generally, ScHoaa, op. cit. supra note 29, at 11-33.
166. GUNNAR MYmAL, AN AmERicAN Dir.a.itA 1290 (lst ed. 1944).
167. McDougal & Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An Anachronism Re-
buried, 52 YALE L.J. 42, 47-48 (1942).
168. Dean, The Myths of Housing Reform, 14 A.e. SocboLooiCAL REV. 281 (April 1949).
See Dunham & Grundstein, The Impact of a Confusion of Social Objecti s on Public
Housing: A Preliminary Analysis, 17 MIACE AND FAMiLY LWvNc Ill (May 1955):
[Recent experience suggests] that the often repeated notion that better housing will
help to lessen the impact of social problems on the community is without foundation.
It is naive at this date to saddle public housing with a burden of social reform that
it cannot carry.
For a less restrained view see ErroRs OF FORTUNE, Tim FxPLODING MEooroLIS 124
(1958):
Once upon a time we thought that if we could only get our problem families out
of these dreadful slums, then papa would stop taking dope, mama would stop chasing
around, and Junior would stop carrying a knife. Well, we've got them in a nice new
apartment with modem kitchens and a recreation center. And they're the same
bunch of bastards they always were.
169. See, e.g., MERTON, The Social Psychology of Housing, in CuRRExr TRENDs L
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Studies of juvenile delinquency, for example, have concluded that
the physical condition of the delinquent's home and neighborhood are
not themselves significant causes of his deviant behavior." 0 Although
children who live in standard housing are more likely to be promoted
regularly (perhaps because they are healthier and attend school more
often),171 housing quality does not significantly affect school perfor-
mance as measured by intelligence tests.Y2 There is no firm evidence
that better housing improves personal and family relations.113 A num-
ber of investigators have found improved morale and higher levels of
aspiration in families who have moved to public housing, but these
attitudes may change simply because social services are more accessible
in public projects and a housing subsidy leaves families with more
money to spend on other things.
Certain diseconomies have been definitely established for substan-
dard housing. Low-quality housing tends to be more combustible, in-
creasing the risk of fire loss on nearby units. More important, better
housing significantly reduces the incidence of illness and accidents,
at least in persons under thirty-five.1 7 4 Childhood infectious and para-
lytic illnesses are particularly sensitive to the quality of housing. But
if health problems were the only object of housing subsidies, the money
might be better spent on public health programs. As Louis Winnick
has pointed out, the Soviet Union, where housing is roughly twice as
crowded, has used medical subsidies to achieve as good a health
record as the United States.175
The aesthetic diseconomies of poor housing have the clearest impact
on people who live outside the slums. External aesthetic diseconomies
are subjective, and often nonquantifiable. There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the removal of aesthetic diseconomies is what prompts much
of the rejoicing that accompanies slum clearance. The new buildings
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 176 (1948), criticizing the findings of Chapin in An Experiment on the
Social Effects of Good Housing, 5 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 868-79 (Dec. 1940).
170. A. Goldfeld, Substandard Housing as a Potential Factor in Juvenile Delinquency
in a Local Area in New York City (unpublished Ph.D. thesis); B. LANDER, TOWARDS AN
UNDERsrANDI G OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1954). See also S. & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING
JUvENILE DELINQUENCY 281-82 (1950), for the general conclusion that the best causal
formula for delinquency would be based on a child's (1) physique, (2) temperament,
(3) attitude, (4) psychology, and (5) socio-cultural environment. The best xecent study of
the causes of delinquency focuses on changes in income and employment. B. FLElsuER,
THE ECONOMICS OF DELINQUENCY (1966).
171. WILNmi, WA.x.EY, PINKERTON & TAYBACK, THE HOUSING ENVIRONMENT AND FAMILY
LIFE 225-37, 251-52 (1962).
172. Id. at 148-59, 249.
178. Id. at 245-63.
174. Id. at 100-10.
175. WINNlcK, AsERICAN HousING AND ITS USE: Tim DEMAND FOR SHELTER SI'ACn 92
(1957).
540
Vol. 76: 508, 1967
Government Housing Assistance
themselves are probably more attractive to outsiders than the old. Im-
proved housing is also likely to keep out of sight people (and their
debris) whom the rest of the community would rather not look at.
Rehabilitation has the most immediate effect on the stock of sub-
standard housing and its attendant discomforts for society. But neither
221(d)(3) BMIR loans, rent supplements, nor public housing projects
produce much rehabilitation activity. Widnall Plan subsidies are some-
times conditioned on slight renovations in the leased units, and there
is some renovation work under a new PHA scheme for purchase of
existing structures for use as public housing projects. By its depressing
effects on rents, any addition to the stock of low-cost housing tends to
reduce the value of run-down buildings and brings closer the day when
they will return to the dust. As the rent supplement program is the
most efficient at producing new housing for low-income families, it is
probably the one that is most likely to facilitate slum clearance. The
221(d)(3) BMIR program might also be quite efficient in this, assuming
favorable linkages between housing submarkets.
Buildings constructed under the various programs may differ con-
siderably in their architectural excellence. Judging solely by per unit
mortgage limitations, 221(d)(3) BMIR projects are the most likely to
be assets to the urban landscape. The cost limitations imposed by the
rent supplement and public housing programs will make it difficult
for architects to prevent these projects from becoming eyesores. Rent
supplement projects will at least tend to be more diverse in design than
public housing, because of the greater variety in their sponsors. The
architectural excellence of these projects depends in large part on the
interest shown by PHA and FHA in their design.
D. Residential Integration of Different Racial
and Economic Groups
Greater racial and economic integration of neighborhoods would
seem advantageous in the long run in terms of reducing conflict,'"0
improving the geographical distribution of the work force, and pro-
moting the equality of opportunity of the ghetto dweller. The public
housing program has contributed egregiously to the segregation of
racial and economic groups within both neighborhoods and buildings.
This might be an inherent defect in any program which requires local
approval of projects involving a large number of low-income families.
176. See Merton. op. cit. supra note 169, at 151, 209-13; ScuoRn, op. cit. supra note 29,
at 48.
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But in contrast, the Widnall Plan, while also administered by local
housing authorities, is an excellent means of achieving integration.
Only a few families are subsidized in each building and neighborhood.
Since the "invasion" is almost invisible, and the "burden" can be
spread throughout the community, many local governing bodies may
be amenable to using this program as an affirmative means toward
integration. The 221(d)(3) BMIR program provides an inconspicuous
method for integrating moderate-income families into higher income
neighborhoods, or into urban renewal areas. Rents in these projects,
however, are beyond the reach of low-income families. The rent sup-
plement program is second only to the Widnall Plan as a means of
integration within projects. The incomes of the tenant families will
cover a broader range than in either public housing or 221(d)(3)
BMIR projects. More important, the rent supplement program is the
most powerful tool for the integration of neighborhoods, and will
become a more powerful one if in the future Congress refrains from
attaching riders on appropriations for the program.
E. Political and Administrative Feasibility of the Program
1. Political support at the federal level
Of the four programs, only rent supplements have failed to obtain
solid bipartisan support in Congress. Congress almost refused to fund
the program for fiscal 1966, and ultimately conditioned its appropria-
tions on emasculating the strategy of preemption of local governing
bodies. The 221(d)(3) BMIR program has proved to be very popular
with the two Housing Subcommittees, as indicated by their rescue of
the program in 1965. There is little real antagonism to public housing
in Congress, but at the same time the program has lost most of its
enthusiasts. Congress seems at best resigned to its continuation. The
Widnall Plan has received little political attention, in part no doubt
because the news media tend to confuse it with rent supplements. As
this program becomes better understood, it may become politically
vulnerable.
The Johnson Administration has given energetic support to the
rent supplement program. In contrast, it has expressed doubts about
continuing the 221(d)(3) BMIR program as its main aid to families of
moderate income. HUD never openly sought the Widnall Plan, but
tolerated its addition to the 1965 Act. Its strong espousal of the rent
supplement program indicates that the Administration may have un-
expressed reservations about the future usefulness of the traditional
public housing program.
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2. Support from project sponsors
In addition to political support at the federal level, housing pro-
grams must be accepted by the groups which carry them out. The
private sector has been receptive to rent supplements and seems to
prefer them to the 221(d)(3) BMIR program which does not offer
enough in subsidies to motivate sponsors to contend with its red tape.
Many local governing bodies are disenchanted with public housing.
Central cities now use the program mainly to build projects for the
elderly, perhaps because it is easier to find uncontroversial sites for
these projects. The Widnall Plan is likely to become increasingly
popular in communities where the construction of new public housing
projects is politically impractical.
3. Demand for program units by eligible tenants
Lastly, the size of a program is limited by the demand among eligible
tenants for units subsidized under it. Of the four, only the public
housing program could conceivably have any problem attracting ten-
ants to its units. Public housing offers a living environment that a
large majority of poor families find unacceptable.177 This lack of popu-
larity could ultimately limit its expansion in some areas.
III. Conclusion
1. Public housing
The public housing program suffers from archaic systems for project
financing and sponsorship. At present it is both a very expensive and
slow means of increasing the housing stock and a contributor to resi-
dential segregation. It places unwarranted power to control tenants'
lives in the hands of the local housing authorities. However, the public
housing program has one redeeming feature. It has by far the most
progressive economic effect of any of the federal housing programs,
helping primarily families of very low income. Nevertheless, the pro-
gram should be drastically reformed in its site selection techniques, its
financing methods, and its administrative practices.
2. Widnall Plan
The only important positive feature of the Widnall Plan is its
capacity to integrate neighborhoods. The plan produces at most token
177. SCHOER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 64, 114; Hollingshead & Rogler, Attitudes toward
Slums and Public Housing in Puerto Rico, in THE URBAN CONDITION 238 (Duhl. ed. 1953);
Hartman, The Limitations of Public Housing, 29 All. Ir~sr. or PA NuMs J. 284 (1963);
Abrams, op. cit. supra note 113, at 35.
543
The Yale Law Journal
improvements in the housing stock. It is moderately progressive and is
somewhat better than public housing in fragmenting power. Much of
the benefit of this program redounds to private landlords in the form
of inflated rent levels. If the rent supplement program gains momen-
tum, providing an alternative means of integration within neighbor-
hoods, the Widnall Plan should be repealed. Welfare and relocation
payments can suffice to help scattered needy families pay their rents.
3. 221(d)(3) BMIR program
As long as its presence doesn't deter private builders from construct-
ing unsubsidized projects, the 221(d)(3) BMIR program is the most
efficient means of increasing housing production. It also can be used
to promote integration and best prevents governmental interference in
the lives of its tenants. The critical flaw of the program is that it fails
to provide housing for the poor, and to correlate subsidy with need.
If Congress ever provides adequate funds for the rent supplement
program, the 221(d)(3) BMIR program should be phased out.
4. Rent supplements
Although untested in practice, the rent supplement program seems
the best of the four. It is an efficient way to increase housing produc-
tion, even if somewhat more expensive than the 221(d)(3) BMIR pro-
gram. It is the best tool for integrating neighborhoods, and would be-
come a better one if unemcumbered by riders on its appropriations.
It is an excellent means for getting government out of the business of
managing low-cost housing projects. It is fairly progressive, although
not so much as public housing. Experience under the program will no
doubt expose defects which will necessitate revisions in the present
structure. However, the kernel ingredient of the rent supplement pro-
gram may be enduring-namely, maximum feasible participation by
the private sector in the implementation of national welfare policy.
ROBERT ELYACKSONt
t Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia. A.B. 1963, Oberlin College; LL.B.
1966, Yale University. The author is indebted to the staff and members of Krooth ?d
Altman, Washington, D.C., for an introduction to the intricacies of the federal housing
programs.
544
Vol. 76: 508, 1967
